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This paper analyses the impact of capital income taxes on financial and 
investment decisions of corporations. Extending Sinn’s (1991) nucleus theory of 
the firm with debt finance, the model determines the optimal sources of finance 
(debt, newly issued equity or retained earnings), the optimal use of the 
investment’s earnings (dividends, retentions, interest payments or debt 
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Sinn (1990, 1991a, 1991b) studies a dynamic life-cycle model of the firm. If retained earnings 
are a cheaper source of finance than newly issued equity, a young firm issues only a nucleus 
of new equity. The return on the initial investment is retained and reinvested during an 
internal growth phase of the firm. The firm keeps reinvesting its earnings for a while. 
Eventually, however, the firm stops investing and starts distributing dividends. Sinn's work 
establishes how the capital income tax system affects the cost of capital throughout the 
entire life cycle of a firm. In particular, the cost of newly issued equity may exceed the cost of 
new equity as derived by King and Fullerton (1984). Intuitively, the more new equity the firm 
issues initially, the lower is the amount of investment that the firm can finance with cheaper 
retained earnings. This effect adds to the opportunity cost of newly issued equity. During the 
initial growth phase when the firm uses all its earnings for reinvestment, the cost of retained 
earnings differs from that computed by King and Fullerton as well. Indeed, during this internal 
growth phase, all the returns on investment are retained and reinvested and not, as assumed 
by King and Fullerton, distributed as dividends.  
 
Also van Schijndel (1986, 1988) studies the impact of corporate and personal taxes on the 
firm’s financial, investment and dividend decisions in a dynamic setting. In contrast to Sinn 
(1991a), van Schijndel focuses on a finite horizon model and assumes that the firm owns an 
exogenous initial amount of equity. The firm is not allowed to issue new equity. Due to the 
model's finite horizon and the differential tax treatment of capital gains and dividends, the 
firm might find it optimal at the end of the time interval to stop distributing dividends and to 
retain the earnings. In contrast to Sinn, van Schijndel does allow for debt financing.  
 
We extend the results derived by van Schijndel (1986, 1988) by introducing debt in Sinn’s 
dynamic life-cycle model of the firm. By allowing for an infinite horizon, the mature firm 
distributes dividends forever. Moreover, the firm endogenously determines the optimal 
amount of initial equity or debt-financed capital. The firm is allowed to issue new equity and 
new debt at any time. These extensions allow us to study the effects of the capital income 
tax system during the entire life cycle of the firm. In particular, as in Sinn (1991a, 1991b), we 
derive the cost of capital along the entire optimal path. Moreover, we investigate the optimal 
sources of finance (debt, newly issued equity or retained earnings), the optimal use of the 
investment’s earnings (dividends, retentions, interest payments or debt redemption) and the 
tax burden throughout the life cycle of the firm. In this way, we extend Sinn’s analysis by 
allowing for debt finance and debt redemption. The possibility of financing initial investment 
with debt allows the firm to more rapidly accumulate earnings that can be distributed or 
retained and reinvested. This may reduce the need to issue tax-disadvantaged new equity. 
As the firm matures, it redeems its debt if retained earnings are tax favoured compared to 
debt.  In this way, debt finance introduces two additional phases compared to the analysis of 
Sinn: one internal growth phase during which investment is financed by a combination of 
debt finance and retained earnings and one phase during which earnings are used to 





Section 2 introduces the life-cycle model of the firm. The steady-state conditions determining 
the tax preferences for the various types of financing are investigated in section 3. Section 4 
discusses the model’s solution if retained earnings are the least preferred source of finance. 
Section 5 explores the firm’s finance and investment behaviour if retained earnings are 




2. The life-cycle model of the firm 
As in Sinn (1991a)1, the firm produces output with capital K  as sole production factor, which 
is assumed not to depreciate. Commodity prices are constant and normalised to unity. The 
firm's revenue and output are described by the production function )(Kf , which satisfies 
0)('',0)(' <> KfKf  and ∞==∞= )0(',0)(')0( fff . The firm finances the investment I  with 
newly issued equity Q , with newly issued debt fS , or with retained earnings. fD  denotes  
the firm’s stock of debt. The model allows for a positive corporate tax rate on distributed 
profits dτ  and on retained profits rτ . pτ  stands for the personal income tax rate on 
dividends and interest income. Capital gains are taxed on an accrual basis. The tax rate on 
realised capital gains is transformed into an equivalent tax rate cτ  on accrued capital gains. 
dτ−1  is denoted by dθ . A similar notation applies to the rτ−1 , pτ−1  and cτ−1 . 
 
The (representative) shareholder wants the firm to maximise the initial value of the shares 
net of the originally injected equity. The shareholder looks through the corporate veil and 
perfectly foresees all variables in the model. The shareholder can lend at the exogenous 
interest rate r .  
The market value of the shares M  is implicitly determined by the arbitrage condition (1). In 
particular, the shareholders are indifferent between retaining shares at a value of M  or 
exchanging these shares for bonds. This implies that the after-tax return on shares equals 






)( .      (1) 
 
The left-hand side of this expression represents the net return on shares ( m  is the price of a 
share, z  is the number of outstanding shares; the dot stands for time derivative of these 
variables). The after-tax return consists of three components: ddp πθθ  is the net dividend 
paid out to shareholders, czm θ
•
 stands for the capital gain from the existing stock of shares 
                                                 
1 The model's notation is borrowed from Sinn (1987). We employ optimal control theory to solve the 
model analytically. The solution procedure of van Loon (1983) is used (see Appendix C), as applied in 
van Schijndel (1986, 1988), van Hilten et al (1993) and Kari (1999). 
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net of the capital gains tax, and cQmz θ)( −
•
 represents the net-of-tax capital gain from buying 
new shares at a price below market value. 
Gross dividends dπ  consist of the firm's revenue net of the firm's interest payments plus the 
attracted newly issued debt and equity net of the firm's investment and the corporate tax on 
retained profits:  
 
))(()( dfrff
d rDKfIQSrDKf πτπ −−−−++−= .    (2) 
 
The firm’s taxable earnings are assumed to be large enough such that interest payments are 
deductible from taxable corporate earnings.  
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The objective function represents the firm's initial period's market value of the shares )( 1tM , 
net of the originally injected equity. This initial equity corresponds to the first-period invested 
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. Integration of this differential 



























, where we have 










































capital )( 1tK  minus the first-period debt )( 1tD f . The capital stock K  and the stock of debt 
fD  are the state variables. The control variables are investment I , newly issued equity Q  
and newly issued debt fS . At most,  a share α  of the investment can be financed with newly 
issued debt, where α  is the maximum debt-capital ratio. The same condition holds during 
the initial period. Debt can thus never exceed )%100( ⋅α  of the capital stock. The amount of 
newly issued equity is non-negative. Hence, the firm is not allowed to repurchase shares. 
Moreover, negative after-tax dividends are excluded.  
 
 
3. Preferred sources of finance 
This section investigates how the capital income tax system impacts the firm's steady-state 
preferences with respect to the three sources of finance: debt, newly issued equity or 
retained earnings. The derivations can be found in Appendix A.1. 
 
The firm prefers retained earnings (RE) over newly issued equity (NE), if capital gains are 








 .        (4) 
 
The firm prefers to reinvest one euro of before-tax earnings (which yields rcθθ  after taxes to 
the shareholder) if reinvestment is more profitable than distributing the earnings as dividends 
(which yields dpθθ  after taxes to the shareholder).   
 
We can compare retained earnings also with newly issued debt as a source of financing. In 
contrast to dividends, interest payments are deductible from taxable corporate earnings. 
Hence, debt is taxed only once, namely at the personal level. The firm then prefers retained 
earnings (RE) to newly issued debt (DF), if the taxation of retained earnings at both the 
corporate level (reflected in rτ ) and personal level (reflected in cτ ) is less than the personal 








 .        (5) 
 
Similarly, the firm in the steady state prefers newly issued debt (DF) to newly issued equity 








 .        (6) 
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4. The model’s solution if rcdpp θθθθθ ≥≥  
This section assumes that rcdpp θθθθθ ≥≥ . These inequities imply that the firm faces 
incentives to distribute its before-tax earnings and to finance additional investment with 
external sources of finance. Moreover, debt is preferred to newly issued equity. 
Consequently, the firm immediately attracts the optimal amount of debt and equity-financed 
capital and starts distributing dividends. The firm invests until the marginal increase in value 
of the firm's equity Kq  as the result of a unit increase in the capital stock equals the cost of 
an additional unit of investment (see Appendix B) 
 
ατ dKq −= 1  .          (7) 
 
The firm prefers to finance an additional investment of one euro entirely with debt, which 
costs only dθ  euro in the steady state. However, the firm is allowed to finance only )%100( ⋅α  
of the investment with debt. Consequently, the firm will have to finance the remaining 
)%100)1(( ⋅−α  with newly issued equity at unit cost. The cost of the marginal investment is 
then a weighted-average of the costs of debt and newly issued equity.  
 





αα )1()(' −+=  .        (8) 
 
The marginal investment financed with newly issued equity yields a return )(' Kf , which is 
distributed as dividends. This return is taxed under both the corporate and personal income 
tax. Consequently, the household's after-tax income equals )(' Kfdpθθ . This investment has 
to yield a return equal to the household's opportunity return rpθ . The cost of capital on 




=)(' . Similarly, a 
marginal debt-financed investment yields a return )(' Kf , which is taxed under the income 
tax. The household's after-tax interest payments )(' Kfpθ  have to be equal to the opportunity 
return rpθ . The cost of capital on debt-financed investment then is given by rKf =)(' . The 
weighted-average cost of capital (8) then follows. 
 
 
5. The model’s solution if dpprc θθθθθ >>  
If dpprc θθθθθ >> , the firm prefers retained earnings to debt and newly issued equity as a 
source of finance in the steady state. In order to defer the taxes on distributed profits 
)1( dpd τττ −+ , the firm prefers to retain and reinvest the profits instead of distributing them 
and then financing additional investment with newly issued equity or debt. If external sources 
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of finance must be attracted, the firm prefers debt to newly issued equity. The solution of the 
problem consists of five successive phases. Appendix C contains the formal derivations.  
 
The capital stock along the optimal path over time is presented in figure 1.  
 
figure 1  
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Since a newly founded firm does not yet possess retained earnings to finance investment, 
the firm has to attract external sources of finance during phase I. The firm faces an incentive 
to finance the initial investment with debt until the cost of capital )(' Kf  equals the interest 
rate r . The firm, however, also has to issue new equity because the limits on the debt-equity 
ratio imply that the firm can finance only part of the investment with debt. The firm issues 
only a nucleus of new equity in order to take advantage of the cheaper retained earnings as 




αα )1())((' 1 −+>  if the production share of capital in a Cobb-Douglas production 
function is sufficiently small. During phase II (section 5.2), the firm finances additional 
investment with debt and retained earnings until rKf =)(' . At this point, it is no longer 
optimal to finance additional investment with debt. Subsequently, the firm redeems its entire 
debt (phase III, section 5.3). In order to defer the taxes on distributed dividends, the firm 
continues to finance the investment with retained earnings, even though the return on the 
investment is lower than the interest rate (phase IV, section 5.4). The shareholder enjoys a 
higher return if the firm retains and reinvests its earnings compared to the firm distributing its 
earnings as dividends and the household investing the resulting after-tax dividends in bonds. 





=)(' . During 
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phase V (section 5.5), the firm stops investing and starts distributing dividends because the 
shareholder prefers to invest the after-tax dividends in bonds. Section 5.6 discusses the 
optimal path over time.  
 
 
5.1 Phase I: starting the firm 
The initial capital stock is financed partly with debt and partly with newly issued equity 
because the newly founded firm does not yet possess retained earnings and can finance 
only a part α  of the investment with debt: )()( 11 tKtD f α= . 
 
5.1.1 The marginal value of capital 
The firm invests until the marginal benefit, which is the marginal increase in value of the 
firm’s equity )( 1tqK , equals the marginal cost of the investment (see Appendix D.1). A part 
α−1  of the marginal investment is financed with newly issued equity at unit cost. The cost of 
debt, which accounts for an investment share α , exceeds the steady-state value. An 
additional unit of debt implies additional interest payments, which not only reduce the 
earnings that can be distributed as dividends, but also decrease the funds available for 
investment. The foregone gain of the additional investment should be added to the net 
present value of the reduction in distributed dividends. Hence, the cost of an additional unit of 
debt exceeds dτ−1  (see Appendix D.1). Consequently, the cost of the marginal investment 
exceeds dd ατταα −=−+− 1)1()1( . The optimal initial investment therefore satisfies 
 
ατ dK tq −>1)( 1  .         (9) 
 
 
5.1.2 The cost of capital if 0=α  
This sub-section studies the cost of capital of the initial investment that can be financed only 
with newly issued equity 0=α . If dividends are taxed less than capital gains (see section 4), 




=)(' . If capital gains are taxed less than dividends, 
this result changes as a result of two effects, which work in opposite directions. As a result of 
the first effect (the ‘internal versus external equity-cost’ effect), the firm faces an incentive to 
issue initially less new equity in order to finance investment with the ‘cheaper’ retained 
earnings. According to the second effect (the ‘time to maturity’ effect), in contrast, the firm 
issues initially more new equity in order to shorten the firm’s internal growth phase. The 
remainder of this section discusses these two effects and introduces a condition that 
determines when the ‘internal versus external equity-cost’ effect dominates the ‘time to 
maturity’ effect. 
 
The ‘internal versus external equity-cost’ effect 
Because dprc θθθθ > , the firm prefers retained earnings to newly issued equity as a source 
of finance. Instead of financing investment directly with newly issued equity at unit cost, the 
firm thus faces an incentive to postpone the investment until it generates sufficient earnings 
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1  of before-











 in terms of foregone dividends, which is lower than the unit cost of 
the investment financed immediately with newly issued equity. As pointed out by Sinn 
(1991a), this preferential tax treatment of retained earnings as a source of finance raises the 
opportunity cost of initially issued new equity. An additional unit of investment financed with 
newly issued equity implies that the firm foregoes the opportunity to employ instead the 
cheaper retained earnings as a source of finance. This opportunity cost must be added to the 




 (section 4).  
 
The ‘time to maturity’ effect 
If the firm issues initially less new equity, however, It takes more time to obtain a substantial 
amount of retained earnings. The firm then requires more time to become mature and to start 
distributing dividends. Consequently, the value of the firm’s equity, which equals the present 
value of the after-tax dividends, declines if the firm issues initially too little new equity. This 
second effect, which originates in the time value of money, explains not only why the firm 
does not issue an infinitesimally small amount of initial new equity, but also why the firm 
might actually issue a substantial amount of initial new equity such that the marginal return 




.  Indeed, the gain of receiving dividends earlier is an 








The pure profit implied by the concave production function )(Kf  can be interpreted as the 
return to a hidden fixed factor of production. Output is assumed to be linearly homogeneous 
in capital and the hidden factor of production3. β  is the production elasticity of capital and σ  
is the Hicksian elasticity of substitution between capital and the hidden production factor. A 
                                                 
3 Assume that the firm’s production function (.)F  is linearly homogeneous in its two arguments, capital 
K~  and another production factor N . The assumption of linear homogeneity allows working with the 














KFKf = . Therefore, output/revenue per unit of hidden factor is written as a function of capital 
per unit of hidden production factor. 
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sufficient condition for the cost of capital of investment financed with newly issued equity to 
















dp  (see Appendix D.2). 
 
Condition on β  
This condition can be expressed as a requirement only on the production share of capital β  
if output is described by a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function, which 
implies that 1=σ . The ‘internal versus external equity-cost’ effect dominates the ‘time to 























   .      (10) 
 
Appendix E. demonstrates that the length of the internal growth phase, which determines the 












1 , the length of the internal growth phase should not be too large 
in order for the ‘internal versus external equity-cost’ effect to dominate the ‘time to maturity’ 


















β , the effect of the difference in investment costs is 
larger than the effect of the time needed to reach maturity. As a direct consequence, the cost 




>))((' 1 .  
 
 
5.1.3 The cost of capital if 1=α  
If 1=α , the cost of capital on a marginal investment financed entirely with debt satisfies (see 
Appendix D.2) 
 
rtKf =))((' 1  .          (11) 
 
As opposed to newly issued equity, debt does not compete with retained earnings. Even 
though retained earnings are the most preferred source of finance, the firm will issue debt as 
long as the investment’s return exceeds the interest rate. The firm does not want to wait to 
invest until it possesses retained earnings. In fact, once the firm generates earnings, they 
can be used to redeem the debt. In terms of foregone dividends, it makes no difference 
whether the firm employs the earnings for investment or redemption of the firm’s debt. 
Moreover, both strategies imply that the firm will be entirely equity-financed once the debt is 
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redeemed. The firm thus faces an incentive to issue new debt as long as the investment’s 
return exceeds or equals the interest rate. Indeed, immediate debt-financed investment 
allows the firm to reach the stage of maturity earlier.  
 
 
5.1.4 The cost of capital if 10 <≤ α  
Because )%100( ⋅α  of the marginal investment is financed with debt and )%100)1(( ⋅−α  is 




















αα     .  (12) 
 
 
5.2 Phase II: internal growth phase (debt and retained earnings) 
During phase II, the firm finances additional investment with debt and retained earnings. The 
firm continues to issue debt because the before-tax return on investment exceeds the 
interest rate. In view of the constraint IS f α= , the firm attracts )1( α
α
−
 units of debt for every 
unit of retained earnings. With the firm generating ))(( fr rDKf −θ  units of retained earnings, 






− fr rDKf .  
 
5.2.1 Cost of capital if 0=α  
Each unit of retained and reinvested before-tax profits must yield the household’s opportunity 
return rpθ . If the firm reinvests the retained profits and the return on this investment is 
















qKf )('θθ , where Kq  denotes the 
marginal value of an additional unit of capital. The direct return on the investment is taxed at 







negative) because decreasing returns in investment implies that an investment financed with 
the retention of the return on a prior investment yields a return lower than the originally 
retained return. The overall change in the firm's market value is then taxed under the capital 
gains tax. Because only rcθθ  euro of after-tax profits are invested, the household's total 

















Kf )('1 θθθθ . Given the household’s required opportunity 













−=)('   .        (13) 
 
 
5.2.2 Cost of capital if 10 <≤ α  
The firm faces an incentive to issue debt because the before-tax return on the investment 
exceeds the interest rate. Put differently, the gain of an additional unit of (debt-financed) 







 for debt-financed investment. This additional gain ceteris paribus 




































































1)('   .    (14) 
 
 
5.3 Phase III: debt redemption 
During phase III, the firm neither invests nor distributes dividends. The firm uses its earnings 
to redeem its debt ))(( frf rDKfS −−= θ  until 0=fD  (see Appendix C.2). This will take 
some time. The firm stops issuing new debt because the investment’s return equals the 
interest rate rKf =)(' .  The increase in value of the firm's equity as a result of a unit 
increase in the capital stock Kq  therefore equals the decrease in value of the firm's equity as 
a result of an additional unit of debt Dq− . 
 
 
5.4 Phase IV: internal growth phase (retained earnings) 
During phase IV, the firm continues to invest. The investment )(KfI rθ=  is financed only 
with retained earnings. The profits of the investment are retained and reinvested. The cost of 

















)('    .     (15) 
 
In order to defer the taxes on distributed dividends and because capital gains are taxed less 
heavily than interest payments, the firm finances additional investment with retained earnings, 
even though the return on the investment is lower than the interest rate. The shareholder 
realises a higher return if the firm retains and reinvests the earnings than if the firm distributes 
the earnings as dividends and the household invests the after-tax dividends in bonds. 
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5.5 Phase V: distribution of dividends 
During phase V, the firm no longer invests and distributes all profits as dividends so that  
)(Kfd =π . The firm invests until the marginal increase in value of the equity Kq  equals the 







  .        (16) 
 
If the firm retains and reinvests an additional euro, the after-tax increase in value of the firm’s 
equity equals Krc qθθ . If the firm distributes the additional euro, the household receives after-
tax dividends dpθθ . The firm invests until the household is indifferent between retaining and 
distributing the firm's earnings. Since capital gains are taxed at lower rates than distributed 
dividends, the marginal increase in value of the equity is thus lower than one euro.  
 
The household is indifferent between an investment financed with retained earnings and 
distributing the earnings and investing the proceeds in market debt. If the firm retains one  
euro of before-tax profits, it can reinvest rcθθ  of after-tax retained earnings. This investment 
yields a return )(' Kf , which is distributed as dividends. Consequently, the household 
realises an after-tax return dprc Kf θθθθ )(' . Instead, the firm can distribute the euro as 
dividends. The household realises then an after-tax opportunity return pdp rθθθ  if the 
dividends are invested in bonds. This yields the following expression for the cost of capital, 







)('   .        (17) 
 
 
5.6 Optimal path over time 
Figure 2 shows how the marginal value of investment Kq  changes with the capital stock over 
time. The concavity of the production function implies that the marginal productivity of capital 
and Kq  are decreasing in the capital stock K .  During the initial phase, the firm immediately 
attracts IK  units of capital. The marginal value of the firm's capital stock satisfies 
ατd
I
Kq −> 1 . Afterwards, the firm enters an internal growth phase. Investment is financed 
with both retained earnings and debt. During this phase, the marginal value of capital 
exceeds the cost of debt: DK qq −> . At the end of this second phase, the firm has 
accumulated IIIK  units of capital. Moreover, rKf =)('  and DK qq −= . During phase III, the 
firm redeems its entire debt. During the second internal growth phase, the firm finances 








. At that point, the firm enters phase V. The firm stops investing and 
distributes all profits as dividends.  
 
If 1=α , the firm’s initial capital stock is entirely financed with debt so that rKf =)(' . In fact, 
the firm jumps immediately towards phase III as the firm does not issue any new equity and 
does not pass through phase II. The firm does, however, go through phases III, IV and V. In 
particular, the firm first uses its earnings to redeem its debt, subsequently employs these 
earnings to finance real investment, and eventually starts distributing the earnings.  
 
If the firm cannot attract debt financing at all (i.e. 0=α ), it issues new equity during the initial 
phase until 1)( 1 =tqK . As discussed in Sinn (1991a), the firm enters an internal growth phase 
during which investment is financed with retained earnings (phase IV). The mature firm starts 
distributing dividends when it reaches phase V. In this case, the firm thus does not pass 
through phases II and III. 
 
figure 2: 
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The corporate tax on distributed earnings dτ  affects the life-cycle of the firm but does not 





=)('  is not affected). . If 0=α , as derived 
in Sinn (1991a), an increase in dτ  consequently lowers the initial capital stock )( 1tK . This 
increases the amount of capital IV KK −  that must be accumulated over time. Hence, an 
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increase in dτ  increases the time required by the firm to become mature. The slowing down 
of capital accumulation, however, becomes less prominent if debt finance is available. 
Indeed, in the extreme case that the firm can finance the investment entirely with debt, it 
immediately attract capital such that rtKf =))((' 1 . Since this initial capital stock is not 
affected by dτ , the tax on distributions does not impact the time path for the accumulation of 
capital at all and the length of the internal growth phase is entirely driven by the difference 




In order to investigate the impact of capital income taxation on real investment and its 
financing, this paper incorporates debt financing in Sinn’s dynamic life-cycle model of the 
firm. The firm’s earnings may thus be distributed not only as dividends but also as interest 
payments. Moreover, they may not only be retained and reinvested but also used to redeem 
debt. Our analysis determines the firm’s optimal source of finance and use of earnings over 
time, and derives the cost of capital during the entire life cycle of a firm.  
 
If capital gains are taxed less heavily than interest payments are and dividends are taxed at 
the highest rates, the firm’s life cycle consists of five successive phases. Initially, the newly 
founded firm issues new equity and debt to start its business. Subsequently, the firm enters 
an internal growth phase during which investment is financed with both debt and retained 
earnings. When the investment’s return has fallen to the level of the interest rate, the firm 
uses its earnings to redeem its entire debt level rather than for the purpose of real 
investment. Once the firm has redeemed all its debt, the firm’s earnings are used again to 
finance investment. Eventually the returns on investment drop so much that the firm stops 
investing and starts distributing its earnings as dividends. 
 
The model could be used to study the effect of share repurchases on the firm’s dynamic 
finance and investment decisions (Brys (2005)). Share repurchases reduce the cost of newly 
issued equity. Hence, the firm might prefer to forego debt financing entirely. Moreover, an 
increase in the amount of share repurchases shortens the firm’s internal growth phase. The 
model could allow for unexpected technology shocks. If an unanticipated technology shock 
enhances the firm’s productivity, the firm might want to issue additional new equity.  
 
Another extension involves the introduction of convex adjustment costs as a result of the 
installation of new capital. In the presence of adjustment costs, the firm’s life cycle may 
consist of two additional feasible phases. First, the firm might pass through an internal 
growth  phase in which it does not use all its earnings for reinvestment but distributes part of 
its earnings. Investing too many funds in the same period might not be efficient, due to the 
adjustment costs. Second, after it has been founded, the firm may continue to employ newly 
issued equity as a source of finance. Intuitively, with adjustment costs raising the costs of 




Appendix A. The preferred sources of finance and the first-order conditions 
 
Given the gross dividends in (2) and a co-state variable Kq  for K  and Dq  for fD  and 
Lagrangian multipliers λ , Qµ  and πµ  for the flow constraints corresponding to, respectively, 
debt financing, newly issued equity, and dividends, the Lagrangian for maximising the firm’s 



































            (18) 
 
A.1. The firm’s preferred sources of finance in the steady-state 
 
In comparing the financial instruments available to the firm, we use the change in market 
value resulting from the substitution of two financial instruments as the evaluation criterion. 
The Lagrangian (18) is linear in fS  and Q . Accordingly, the solutions are boundary 
solutions. This allows us to ignore the flow constraints in (18), which then reduces to the 
current-value Hamiltonian H . 
Given fS  and I , marginally increasing Q  in (18) measures the marginal advantage of 
distributing one euro of before-tax retained earnings (RE) and financing investment with an 




















.    (19) 
 
This yields expression (4) in the main text.  
Given values for I  and Q , marginally raising fS  in (18) measures the marginal advantage 
of distributing one euro of before-tax retained earnings (RE) that is replaced by an additional 


















.      (20) 









q = , given the value of 
)(tdπ  and because 0=πµ  (since the firm distributes dividends in the steady state), amounts 
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Substituting (21) into (20) yields (5) in the main text.  
























,   (22) 
 
and substituting (21).  
 
A.2 The model’s first-order conditions 
 



























































1:0 .      (25) 
 
(23) and (24) imply: λαµ −−= QKq 1 ,           (26) 
(24) and (25) imply: 1−+= QDq µλ ,         (27) 
(23) and (25) imply: )1( αλ −+−= DK qq .        (28) 
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 .       (32) 
 
Adding (29) and (31) and using (28) yields: 
 
( )





































p .  (33) 
 





























































 (36).  
 
 
Appendix B. The model’s solution if rcdpp θθθθθ ≥≥   
 
rcdpp θθθθθ ≥≥  implies that the firm prefers external to internal sources of finance. As a 
result, the firm directly attracts the optimal amount of capital and starts distributing dividends, 
which implies that 0=πµ . (21) and (35) then imply that dτλ = . Substitution of this result in 
(34) yields (7).  

























. In view of the constant interest rate and 0=πµ , 
the solution of this integral yields rqKf Kd =)('θ . Substituting the value of Kq  (from (7)), we 
then derive the cost of capital of (8). 
 19 
 
Appendix C. The model’s solution if dpprc θθθθθ >>  
 
Applying the solution procedure of van Loon (1983), this section derives the solution of the 
firm’s problem in (3) if dpprc θθθθθ >> .  
A phase is characterised by the values of IQd ,,π  and fS . Given the first-order conditions 
and the assumption that dpprc θθθθθ >> , the first and second step of the solution procedure 
determines the feasible phases (Appendix C.1) and characterises these phases in terms of 
the value of the control variables, the state variables, the cost of capital and the co-state 
variables (Appendix C.2). The third step determines the final phase(s) (Appendix C.3). The 
chain of feasible phases is obtained if the Lagrange multipliers, the co-state variables and 
the state variables are proven to be continuous (Appendix C.4). The final step checks 
whether the first phase of the optimal solution satisfies the initial condition (Appendix C.5).    
 
C.1. The feasible phases 
 
  
Phase  π   Q   I   fS     
 
A.  0  0  0  0  infeasible 
B.  0  0  0  <0  
C.  0  0  >0  Iα  
D.  0  0  >0  IS f α<<0  infeasible 
E.  0  0  >0  0 
F.  0  0  >0  <0  infeasible 
G.  0  >0  0  0  infeasible  
H.  0  >0  0  <0            prc θθθ =⇔  
I.  0  >0  >0  Iα   infeasible 
J.  0  >0  >0  IS f α<<0  infeasible 
K.  0  >0  >0  0  infeasible 
L.  0  >0  >0  <0  infeasible 
M.  >0  0  0  0     
N.  >0  0  0  <0            prc θθθ =⇔   
O.  >0  0  >0  Iα             dprcp θθθθθ ≥≥⇔  
P.  >0  0  >0  IS f α<<0  infeasible 
Q.  >0  0  >0  0  infeasible 
R.  >0  0  >0  <0  infeasible 
S.  >0  >0  0  0            dprc θθθθ =⇔  
T.  >0  >0  0  <0            dpprc θθθθθ ==⇔  
U.  >0  >0  >0  Iα             dprc θθθθ =⇔  
V.  >0  >0  >0  IS f α<<0  infeasible 
W.  >0  >0  >0  0  infeasible 




Phase A. is excluded because, by assumption, it is profitable to invest in at least 1 phase. 
The Lagrangian (18) is linear in fS . This implies that the solutions are boundary solutions. 
This explains the exclusion of phases D., J., P., and V. Phase G. implies that 
0))(( <−−= fr rDKfQ θ , which contradicts 0≥Q  (see (3)). 0=λ  in phase F. implies that 
DK qq −=  (see (28)). Taking the time derivative, we establish 
••
−= DK qq . Using (30) and 
(32), we find that this equation simplifies to rKf =)(' , which implies that the cost of capital, 
and therefore the capital stock, are constant during phase F. However, the constraints of the 
model (see (3)) imply 0))(( >+−==
•
ffr SrDKfIK θ . This contradiction shows that phase 
F. is not feasible. 0== λµQ  in Phase K., which implies 1=Kq  (see (26)). This implies that 
0=
•





=)(' , which implies that the cost of capital and the 
capital stock are constant during phase K. However, the constraints of the model (see (3)) 
imply 0))(( >+−==
•
QrDKfIK frθ . This contradiction causes phase K. to be infeasible. 
Phase I., L., Q., R., W. and X. are excluded on similar grounds. Phases H., N., S., T. and U. 
are excluded because they do not satisfy the assumption dpprc θθθθθ >> . For instance, in 
phase U., we have 0== Qµµπ . (24) then shows that this phase is feasible only if 
rcdp θθθθ = , which contradicts our assumptions. Finally, λ  is either 0 or positive in phase O. 
If 0=λ , phase O. is not feasible because the cost of capital and the capital stock cannot be 
constant while the investment level is positive. If 0>λ , (23) implies 
••
−= λαKq . Substitution 




















αλ . Hence, 0>λ  if and only if rKf ≥)(' . 
This contradiction implies that phase O. is not feasible. 
 
 
C.2. Characterisation of the feasible phases 
 
Phase C. (section 5.2):             




















































Phase B. (section 5.3):            
0,0,0,0,0,0,0 ≥>=<=== QfSIQ µµλπ π . 
The budget constraint (2) simplifies to ))(( frf rDKfS −−= θ , which implies 0<=
•
frf rSS θ . 
























 and substituting it in the cost of capital then yields rKf =)(' .  





=  (23) and 
therefore that 0=
•





=)(' , which contradicts the result that 
rKf =)(' . Consequently: 0>πµ .  











. The Lagrange multiplier πµ  measures 
the increase in value of the firm’s equity if the firm would redeem an additional unit of debt. 
Debt redemption is profitable if 0)( >−− dpDrc q θθθθ . This condition is satisfied because 
dDq θ−<  (from (21) and 0>πµ ) and prc θθθ > . The firm therefore redeems its entire debt 
level during phase B. 
 
Phase E. (section 5.4):   
0,0,0,0,0,0,0 ≥>==>== QfSIQ µµλπ π . 

















======> ,0,0,0,0,0,0 . 
(2) implies f







µ  from (24). Since 0=λ  (it can be 
demonstrated that 0>λ  is infeasible; a similar analysis was already presented with respect 





= , which implies that 0=
•
Kq . 








C.3. The final phase 


























































. Phase B. cannot 
be the final phase because of the finite debt level (the firm cannot buy back debt forever). 


































. Since the concave 
















 and therefore that ( ) ))((lim))((lim trDtKf ftt ∞→∞→ < . 
Consequently phase C. cannot be a final phase because it would imply that the firm's 
revenues decrease below the interest payments. Similar arguments prevent phase E. from 
being a final phase. Indeed, phase M. is the only feasible final phase because 
0)()()()( ====
••••
tqtDtqtK DfK . 
 
C.4. The optimal sequence of phases 
This section determines the optimal sequence of phases by analysing the continuity of πµ , 
Qµ , λ , Kq , Dq , )(tK  and )(tD f . Given the final phase M., phase C. may precede phase M. 
if 0)( =CMtπµ  and if 0)( =CMtλ . This last condition is satisfied if 0≤
•
λ  when 0=λ  in phase 
C. Evaluating (33) in phase C. when 0=λ , we obtain that rKf ≥⇔≤
•
)('0λ . However, 
since prc θθθ > , phase M. is characterised by rKf <)(' . This contradiction implies the 
discontinuity of )(tK  when going from phase C. to phase M. Consequently, phase C. cannot 
precede phase M. Phase B. can not precede the final phase either. The cost of capital in 





=)('  during phase M. Because prc θθθ > , 
this would again imply a discontinuous jump in )(tK . Phase E. precedes phase M. if 
0)( =EMtπµ , which is satisfied if 0≤
•








































µ ππ . Consequently,  0≤
•






≥)('  which holds along the entire path. It implies that Phase E. precedes phase 
M. We now demonstrate that the firm after phase C. passes through phase B. before it 
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enters phase E. Comparing the cost of capital in phase C. and E. shows that the continuity of 









q . This condition 
is equivalent with 0lim =→ λEC . Hence, we have to prove the continuity of λ , which holds if 
0≤
•
λ  if 0=λ  in phase C. Evaluating (33) at 0=λ , we obtain that rKf ≥⇔≤
•
)('0λ . 
Therefore, the continuity of λ  can be guaranteed only if the firm, after phase C., passes 
through phase B., where rKf =)(' , before it enters phase E. 
 
C.5. The initial condition 
This section checks whether the optimal path satisfies the initial condition. (30) implies that 
0≤
•





≥)(' . A sufficient condition for the initial 
condition (34) to be satisfied is that 0≤
•
Kq  when λα−= 1)( 1tqK . From (30), we obtain that 
0≤
•






λα )1())((' 1 −≥ . Since the initial capital stock is determined endogenously, this 
condition is a requirement on the shape of the production function. If it is satisfied, the firm 
will issue the optimal initial amount of new equity and debt and will jump towards the optimal 












λθ  along the optimal path if 
prc θθθ > . Evaluating (32) at 1)( 1 −= λtqD , it can be demonstrated that 0≥
•
Dq , which 
implies that the second initial condition is satisfied as well. Because 0>λ  in the initial 
condition, the firm jumps towards phase C. and not towards phases B., E. or M. (phase C. it 
is the only phase where 0>λ ). 
 
 
Appendix D. The initial phase if dpprc θθθθθ >>   
 
D.1. The initial period’s co-state variables 
If dpprc θθθθθ >> , profitable investment opportunities remain after the initial period’s 
investment. As a result, the firm does not directly start distributing dividends, which implies 


























1)( . The initial condition (35) then implies 




D.2. The initial period’s cost of capital 
• 1=α  
If 1=α , the firm finances the investment entirely with debt. Since λ  is the gain of an 




















αλ . Under the assumption of a concave 
production function and a constant interest rate, the firm then continues to finance 
investment with debt until rKf =)(' .  
 
• 0=α  
If 0=α , this section derives a condition under which the cost of capital of initial investment 




>))((' 1 .  











=)('  if '2KK =   ,  (37) 
1)( '1 == Kqq KK      if 
'
1KK =    .  (38) 
 
Moreover, if 0=α , (30) and )(KfK rθ=
•



















  for '2
'
1 KKK ≤≤   .    (39) 
 







= . By definition, it holds that: 
 














=)('  if '2KK =   .  (41) 
 




=)(' 1 . If 1)( 1 <KqK  and given that 1)(
'
1 =KqK , the initial period’s capital stock 
'










dqK ). In view of 0/)( <<∞− dKKdqK  for 
'
20 KK << , (37), (38), (40) and 








































































































dp .        (43) 
 
 
• 10 <≤ α  




>))((' 1  if (43) is fulfilled. Since the 























Appendix E. The length of the internal growth phase 
 





=)('  ((17)) and under the assumption 




=)(' , the steady-state capital stock and 



















































r ⋅⋅=  if 0=α . Using 
IK  as the initial condition, we find that the solution of 























. In view of )( SSSS tKK = , this 























. If dprc θθθθ > , 
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